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Abstract

When World War I erupted in 1914, German artists, writers, and academics
seemed to be united behind a shared belief that the military struggle of World War I was
actually the manifestation of a deeper and more ferocious spiritual or cultural war
(Kulturkrieg). Using propagandistic wartime writings, they invoked the idea that
Germany's unique spirit of community and idealism (Kultur) was under assault by Allied
individualism and materialism (Zivilisation). Many were convinced that defeat in this
conflict meant the total destruction of the German way of life, while victory would propel
the German nation toward a new era of prosperity. Strangely, however, in spite of its
unanimity concerning the Kulturkrieg, by the end of the war the German intellectual
community had disintegrated into various competing factions. This study explores the
reasons for this division and challenges the notion that German intellectuals were ever
deeply united during World War I.
An examination of three pieces of wartime propaganda written by three
exemplary intellectuals (Werner Sombart, Friedrich Meinecke, and Thomas Mann)
reveals that these individuals did share a common notion of German identity, which was
largely based on the German Idealist tradition, and that they all believed that a culturally
revived German nation would emerge from the ashes of World War I. Nevertheless, the
particular political views held by each of these men colored their propaganda and shaped
their visions of postwar Germany. This study concludes that these differing political
inclinations threatened to undermine any consensus over cultural issues that might have
existed among the German intellectual community. Thus, it claims that the outward
display of unanimity by German intellectuals at the beginning of the war was merely a
fragile exterior, unable to conceal (or cure) deeper political disagreements.
Bolstering arguments made by Fritz Ringer, Wolfgang Mommsen, and other
historians, this study maintains that the divisiveness that existed among German
intellectuals during World War I carried over into the Weimar period, weakening the
ideological foundations of that fledgling government. Additionally, similar to the work
of Modris Eksteins, this thesis claims that German intellectuals were not motivated by an
urge to preserve the existing Imperial system but, instead, sought to forge a new German
society on the anvil of war. By popularizing this desire through war propaganda,
intellectuals unknowingly helped prepare the public for the utopian message of the Nazis.
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Introduction
"All great wars are wars of faith, as it was in the beginning, it is in the present,
and it will be in the future." 1 Thus begins Werner Sombart's polemical pamphlet
Handler und Heiden (Merchants and Heroes). Written in 1915, the opening statement of

this fiery tract demonstrated its author's conviction that the military struggle of World
War I was accompanied by a deeper and more ferocious spiritual or cultural conflict. In
his view, a battle raged between the defenders of community and culture, the German
"heroes," and the proponents of individualism and materialism, the cowardly English
"merchants." For Sombart, defeat in this conflict meant the total destruction of the
German way of life, but victory would usher in a new age of German cultural supremacy.
While the grandiloquent style of Handler und Heiden was largely unrivaled by
Sombart's contemporaries, the central message of that text was echoed in countless
publications by German intellectuals throughout World War I. 2 In their writings, like
Sombart, these intellectuals attempted to invoke the belief that Germany was in the midst
of a cultural struggle with the Allied powers. On one side stood the German spirit of
community and idealism (Kultur), on the other Allied individualism and materialism
(Zivilisation). 3 Not surprisingly, France and England, the originators of the French and

Industrial Revolutions, posed the greatest cultural threat to Germany; while Russia, with

1

Werner Sombart, Handler und Helden. Patriotische Besinnungen (Munich: Stephan Geibel & Co.,
1915), 3.
2 For examples of these writings, see Aufrufe und Reden deutsche Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg,
Klaus Bohme, ed., (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1975).
3
This dichotomy between Zivilisation and Kultur was not unique to World War I propaganda, but had
its roots in the German romanticism of the early nineteenth century. For more on the concepts of
Zivilisation and Kultur see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: the Intellectual Origins of the
Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Fritz Stem, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study of
the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).
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its perceived cultural and industrial backwardness, was often considered to be but a pawn
of Western Europe. As with Sombart, most of these intellectuals predicted that if
Germany was defeated in the war, its unique culture would disappear. However, if
Germany were to vanquish its foes, its culture would be purified and the German nation
would be propelled toward a new era of prosperity. 4
The ubiquity of this Kulturkrieg (culture war) theme in the wartime writings of
German intellectuals seems to indicate that the German intellectual community was
largely united during World War 1. 5 However, while it is true that German intellectuals
appeared to speak with one voice at the beginning of the war, by war's end, this singular
voice had disintegrated into a cacophony of competing messages. In light of this fact,
modem historians have been left with the task of uncovering both the forces that united
these intellectuals and those that destroyed their sense of unanimity. But while scholars
have devoted numerous studies to resolving these issues, uncertainties and ambiguities
still exist.
Although more suggestive than exhaustive, this case study of three exemplary
German intellectuals and their propagandistic wartime writings will help to illuminate

This general interpretation of World War I was not entirely unique to German intellectuals. In the
Allied nations as well, intellectuals rallied to support the military effort of their respective states by
describing World War I as a moral struggle for cultural supremacy. Many of their wartime publications
mirrored the German intellectuals' practice of demonizing an enemy's culture, praising one's own culture,
and claiming that the war held redemptive powers for one's nation. For an overview of this phenomenon
among European intellectuals, see Rolland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1982). For studies of the individual Allied nations, see Martha
Hanna. The Mobilization of the Intellect: French Scholars and Writers during the Great War (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996); Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War
and English Culture (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992); Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic
Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995).
5
For a discussion of the concept of Kulturkrieg in World War I publications see Wolfgang G. Natter,
Literature at War, 1914-1940: Representing the "Time of Greatness" in Germany, (New York: Yale
University Press, 1999), 123-7.
4
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some of the dark areas in the historiography. 6 More specifically, this examination of
works by Wemer Sombart, Friedrich Meinecke, and Thomas Mann will demonstrate that,
during World War I, the German intellectual community was never as united as it
appeared. Instead, the differing political inclinations that the intellectuals carried with
them into the war ultimately undermined any outward display of consensus over cultural
revival. Thus, like a microcosm of Imperial Germany, the intellectual community's
shining exterior of strength and unanimity failed to conceal the fragmentation and
disjointedness that existed just below the surface. 7
In order to demonstrate the significance of these conclusions, it is necessary to
establish an understanding of the historiographic issues that this study addresses. This
requires a close examination of the debates surrounding the nature of unity among
German intellectuals during World War I. Additionally, since these debates have evolved
in accordance with changes in the larger historiography of modem Germany, a discussion
of some of these general trends is necessary to reveal the broader implications of this
study.
One of the most important developments in the post-1945 historiography of
modem Germany came from Fritz Fischer's controversial Gennany's Aims in the First
World War. 8 This study challenged the longstanding belief among German scholars that
6

In this study, the term "intellectual" is used to denote an individual who makes a living by exercising
the intellect and/or by engaging in abstract thought (i.e. generally artists, writers, and academics).
Furthermore, "propaganda" is understood as any information that reflects the views of its disseminator(s).
This definition comes from the classic text, Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation ofMen's Attitudes,
trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner (New York: Random House, 1965; Vintage Books, 1973).
7
For a standard account of Imperial Germany's fragmented nature see Holger H. Herwig, Hammer or
Anvil?: Modern Germany 1648-Present (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1994).
8
Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (1961. trans. ed. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1967, published in German under the title Griff nach der Weltmacht, Dtisseldorf: Droste
Verlag und Druckerei GmbH).

4

their nation had been lured or forced into World War I and thus its war aims had been
purely defensive in nature. Many of these same scholars drew clear distinctions between
the natures of World War I and World War II. They claimed that rise of Nazism and its
aggressive war policies had been an aberration, disconnected from the rest of German
history. In Germany's Aims, Fischer maintained that Imperial Germany was largely
responsible for the outbreak of World War I, and that its aggressive pursuit of world
power status and annexationist objectives closely resembled the policies of Nazi
Germany in World War IL While he sidestepped any direct discussion of continuities
between the wars, Fischer made it clear that strong similarities existed between the two.
Much of Fischer's work was peripheral to the historiography of German
intellectuals; nonetheless, that group still played an important role in his study of war
aims. In particular, Fischer believed that the creation of the "ideas of 1914" and other
such propaganda gave voice to the broadly held national desire for world power status
and gave Germany's war effort a sense of mission. 9 While most Germans already agreed
that their nation was poised to replace Great Britain as the undisputed leader in European
affairs, they were equally eager to accept the intellectuals' portrayal of the war as a clash
between opposing moral forces. According to Fischer, this quasi-religious interpretation
of the war "had nothing to do with any realistic political thought" but was effective

9

The phrase "ideas of 19 14" was coined by the German economist Johann Plenge during the first year
of World War I, but it was soon adopted and employed by much of the German intellectual community.
The term was intended to denote a set of ideological principles that were unique to the German nation and
were the foundations of the so-called "spirit of 19 14" (the euphoric feeling of national unity that they
claimed all Germans experienced at the beginning of the war). For more information on both the "ideas of
19 14" and the "spirit of 19 14" see Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization
in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

5
"precisely because of its non-rational, emotional appeal." 10 At the most basic level, these
patriotic outbursts reflected a shared desire among almost all German intellectuals for
both national power and national security. Thus, a message of preservation, as well as
expansion, lay at the heart of the "ideas of 1914." Simply put, by promoting the idea of
Germany's cultural uniqueness, intellectuals also advocated the defense of traditional
social structures from the encroachments of democracy. Geopolitically, this translated
into an endorsement of the creation of territorial buffer zones to shield Germany from the
cultural influences of both the East and West. 11 While they may have disagreed over the
specific nature or extent of territorial expansion, a desire for annexations superceded
political affiliations and united all German intellectuals.12
While the so-called "Fischer Controversy" dominated the general historiographic
debates during the 1960's, the end of that decade witnessed the introduction of an
important contribution to the study of German intellectuals during World War I. Focusing
on only one segment of the intellectual community, Fritz Ringer's The Decline of the
German Mandarins chronicled the development of the German academic community

from 1890 to 1930. 13 In doing so, it attempted to account for that group's descent from a

10
11

Fischer, Germany's Aims, 156.
Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline: The Controversy Over Germany's Aims in the First World
War, trans. Lancelot L. Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber. (trans. ed. W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1974, originally titled Weltmacht oder Niedergang Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt,
1965), 82, 91-2.
12
Fischer does qualify his conclusions by admitting that, prior to 1917, left-leaning intellectuals
"attached less importance to direct annexations and were chiefly concerned with extending Germany's
power in east Europe and overseas." Yet he points to a petition of 1917, signed by some of the most liberal
intellectuals (Friedrich Meinecke being one), advocating the annexation of the Baltic provinces, as proof
that "the principle of annexations...was thus by no means foreign to the Liberal circle round Delbrtick,
Harnack, and Naumann..." Fischer, Germany's Aims, 173.
13 Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 18901933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969).
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position of unity during Imperial Germany to one of political and ideological dividedness
during Weimar.
According to Ringer, the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a distinctive
educated class of German elites. This group of "mandarins" was composed of doctors,
lawyers, university professors, and any other profession that required an advanced degree
and the completion of entrance examinations. 14 In the early-nineteenth century, the
mandarins had relatively little power within society; however, as Germany began the
process of unification and the state became more bureaucratic, these men became
important advisors to the government. Out of this situation, a symbiotic relationship
developed between the state and academic elites. As counselors to the ruling elites, the
mandarins enjoyed an elevated status within German society; in return they provided the
state with an unending supply of loyal and capable civil servants. 15
As their influence within German society increased, the mandarins attempted to
legitimize their position as members of the upper class by constructing a myth concerning
the nobility of learning. They maintained that the mandarin style of education went
beyond the mere retention of facts or pursuit of "practical knowledge"; instead, it was a
matter of personal cultivation (Bildung), which refined a man's sense of culture and
provided him with "spiritual ennoblement." Thus the mandarins claimed they were both
experts in worldly matters and bearers of the German culture and spirit of idealism. In

14

Ringer, Mandarins, 5. Ringer's use of the term "mandarin" pays homage to Max Weber's study of
Chinese literati. In a European setting, he defines the term as "a social and cultural elite which owes its
status primarily to educational qualifications, rather than hereditary rights or wealth."
15
Ibid., 12-3.
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this way education became a substitute for the nobility of birth and provided them with a
common notion of identity. 1 6
Unification increased the mandarin influence in society but, as Ringer shows, it
also brought challenges to their newfound success. In essence, an increased emphasis on
economic growth caused the development of an industrialized society with a new system
of values. Consumerism and the desire for affluence intensified. The middle and
working classes demanded a greater influence over political matters. Pressure groups
openly subordinated political activity to economic objectives; and culture increasingly
played a secondary role to utility. 1 7
Yet the mandarins did not accept these changes with silent resignation; instead,
Ringer claims, they attempted to use whatever influence they still possessed to convince
the German people to preserve Imperial society. 1 8 This rhetoric of preservation reached a
fevered pitch during World War I in a multitude of propagandistic writings on the "ideas
of 1914." These tracts attempted to harness public support for mandarin values by giving
voice to the feelings of national solidarity experienced by most Germans during the initial
stages of the war. The mandarins claimed that the "August experience" signaled the end
of conflict over political and economic issues and the beginning of a socially united
Germany. 1 9 In their view, this was the initial stage in the healing process of the Imperial

16

Ringer, Mandarins, 9.
These changes even reached into the mandarins' educational sphere, as was evident in the changing
university curriculum. As members of the middle class began to stream into German universities they had
little concern for the broad, "mandarin" style of education. Instead these new students were more
interested in specialization and fields of knowledge that were useful in an industrialized society, a source of
deep discomfort for the mandarins. Ibid., 48-9, 50.
18
Ibid., 253-7.
19
The so-called "August experience" refers to the German people's overwhelming display of national
unity in the days surrounding the declaration of war in August, 19 14.
17

8

state. Only France and Britain stood in the way of success; but by defeating these
progenitors of materialism and individualism in battle, Germany could extinguish the
source of those cultural and societal pollutants. 20
In Ringer's view, these wartime polemics were intended to point out flaws in the
German society and encourage the adoption of mandarin values. 2 1 Ultimately, however,
the mandarin's propaganda campaign was unsuccessful. Not only did it fail to convince
the masses to preserve the existing political system, but it also precipitated the first open
disagreement within the mandarin community. Ringer claimed that, by 1916, the
mandarins had split over how to apply the "ideas of 1914" to German society. The vast
majority of mandarins occupied the "orthodox" position, which was characterized by its
"doctrinaire, single-minded, and logically uncomplicated" approach to social change. 22
These men obstinately clung to the institutions of Imperial Germany and believed that the
reforms suggested in the "ideas of 1914" should reinforce the old power structures. In
opposition to the "orthodox" position stood a small minority of "modernists," who
advocated a more balanced interpretation of the "ideas of 1 9 14." 23 They realized that the
process of industrialization could not be reversed; and therefore, making blanket
condemnations of the modem age was pointless. It was true that they believed in the
superiority of German culture over Western, mass culture, yet they resigned themselves
20

Ringer, Mandarins, 180-3, 187-9.
In a passage that is of great importance to this essay Ringer explicitly states this position by saying:
"The most important point to be made about the German intellectuals' attack on the West was that it was
intended for domestic consumption . ..Everything that had disturbed the mandarins in the social and cultural
life of their country since 1870 was introduced into the character of England. Everything they had sought
to preserve or to re-create became a part of the 'spirit of 1914.' The purpose of both maneuvers was to
erect permanent symbols of the mandarins' own values." Ibid., 187.
2
Ibid., 129.
23
Ringer makes no attempt to hide the fact that he believes the members of this group to be more
articulate, politically sophisticated, and "intellectually distinguished" than their orthodox counterparts.
Ibid., 130.
21
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to the fact that democratization was inevitable. Thus, they decided it would be better to
take an active role in the process in order to salvage what they could of the old mandarin
culture and avoid being marginalized. 24
This division between orthodox and modernists intensified during the final two
years of the war. According to Ringer, as the German prospects for total victory
diminished, the orthodox became increasingly rigid in their general views on reform.
This intransigence, combined with an irrational assessment of German war aims and a
growing support for nationalistic associations, alienated modernists. By the end of the
war, the modernists broke free from their orthodox counterparts and cautiously joined the
masses in supporting the establishment of a democratic government. 25
Ringer's final conclusion was that, although it was not their aim to do so, the
mandarins contributed to the rise of Nazism. The internal disagreements of the war years
carried on into the Weimar period and weakened the fledgling republic. More
importantly, the mandarins' identification with the old caste system of Imperial Germany
and their resistance to change caused them to attack rational solutions to social
problems. 26 Ringer claimed that this flight from reality laid the groundwork for the anti
intellectualism of the Nazi regime that would eventually destroy the mandarin way of
life. 27
It is clear from Ringer's conclusions that he and Fischer shared some of the same
basic assumptions about German intellectuals. Most significantly, both authors believed
24

Ringer, Mandarins, 193-6.
Ibid., 199-200.
26
Even the modernists were to blame because they too engaged in escapist fantasies, such as the "ideas
of 19 14." Ibid., 445.
27
Ibid., 446-9.
25

10

that academics' actions during the war were primarily guided by a desire to preserve and
protect the social and political structures of Imperial Germany. Revealing the ways in
which that desire influenced the development of a common mandarin identity is a crucial
component of Ringer's study. And yet Ringer's entire purpose was to demonstrate that,
in spite of prior unifying forces, World War I created conflicts which precipitated a clear
division of the mandarin community. Therefore, unlike Fischer, he stressed the
importance of the mandarins' political affiliations and how these led to very different
interpretations of the "ideas of 1914" and territorial annexations. By the end of Ringer's
text, one is confronted by the picture of an academic community united by a desire to
preserve but, at the same time, divided by political philosophies.
Ringer's interpretation of the German academic community remained largely
uncontested for over a decade. In part, this was a testament to the quality and depth of
the work. However, it was also due to the fact that Ringer built his conclusions upon a
view of German history that Fischer popularized. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's,
historians followed Fischer's lead by drawing lines of continuity between the
development of Nazism and its possible antecedents in Imperial Germany. 28 The result
was an increase in scholarship comparing Germany's political development to that of
Western Europe. These studies concluded that Germany suffered from a malformed or
backward political system which produced authoritarian "illiberalism" instead of Western

28

For two excellent examples of this, see George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: the
Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Fritz Stern, The Politics of
Cultural Despair: A Study of the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1961).
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democracy. 29 Consequently, all German elites suffered from a particular kind of "cultural
despair" which made them fearful of modem, industrial society and resulted in "an
inflexible defense of the status quo."30 This model remained largely unchanged until the
early 1980's, when David Blackboum and Geoff Eley produced a critical study that
altered the way historians conceived of Imperial Germany.
In their text, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics
in Ninteenth-Century Germany, Blackboum and Eley attempted to address the orthodoxy

that Germany followed a "Sonderweg" or special, twisted path of development. 3 1 Their
primary goal was to discount the teleological belief that the rise of Nazism was somehow
predetermined by the state of affairs in Imperial Germany. In order to accomplish this,
they challenged the idea that the failure of the German bourgeoisie to successfully
overthrow the Imperial government left it feeble, underdeveloped, and vulnerable to
"refeudalization" by the aristocracy. They maintained that the idea of a "normal"
bourgeois revolution was flawed because there has never been an instance, in any
country, in which the middle class has overthrown a government and immediately begun
altering politics to suit its own identity. The two authors believed it was more fruitful to
judge the position of the German bourgeoisie by examining societal changes such as the
growth of free-market competition, rule of law, and voluntary associations; all of which
in fact indicate a strong middle class influence. When considering these areas in Imperial

29

Fritz Stern, The Failure of llliberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).
30
Ibid., xx.
31
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and
Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
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Germany it becomes clear that the bourgeoisie, not the aristocracy, represented the
"general interests" of that society. 32
On the subject of the relationship between Imperiai Germany and the modern age,
Eley claimed that it is deceptive to refer to the Imperial German state as "backward" or
anachronistic. In fact, he believed that if one considered the technocratic efficiency of its
bureaucracy and military, and the level of state intervention in public affairs, then
Germany was one of the most "modern" states in Europe. 33 With regard to "cultural
despair," Blackbourn maintained that Germans were not alone in their mistrust of and
anxieties about the modern age. The French and British also demonstrated a general
uneasiness over the effects of industrialization. He concluded this discussion by stating
that, if there was anything peculiar about the German case, it was that anxiety often
manifested itself in a "shallow optimism" over new possibilities of social and moral
progress. 34
The impact of these conclusions on the historiography of Modern Germany has
been great. Blackboum and Eley demonstrated that the German bourgeois were not as
weak as scholars had previously claimed, nor were the members of the aristocracy as
strong as supposed. Additionally, by questioning ideas of German backwardness,
Blackbourn and Eley paved the way for studies on the progressive aspects of Imperial
society. Modris Eksteins' Rites of Spring was one of these studies. 35

Blackbourn and Eley, Peculiarities, 190.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid., 216-7.
35
Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modem Age, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1989; New York: Anchor Books, 1990).
32

33
34
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As its title suggests, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modem
Age argued that World War I was a watershed or breakthrough moment from which a
distinctly modem system of values came to predominate over all others. For Eksteins,
these values (speed, newness, transience, inwardness, liberation, and most of all
movement) appeared most strikingly in Germany, making it the twentieth century's
modem nation par excellence. 36 He explained that, in the years before the war,
Germany's rapid industrialization had instilled in its inhabitants an urge to create,
advance, and expand. They felt more than a mere "shallow optimism" for the possibility
of progress, as Blackboum suggested; instead, Eksteins claimed, Germans were "starkly
future oriented" and confronted the problems of industrial life with the belief that "where
there was dissatisfaction or anxiety, it was to be overcome by change." 37 A long-standing
philosophical tradition of German idealism provided them with explanations for their
position.38 They believed that the German nation was engaged in a process of
transformation; by becoming the vanguard of forward movement, it would soon embody
the spiritual dynamism of the age. All that was needed was a catalyst, a "breakthrough"
that would propel this process toward completion. In World War I the Germans found
their vehicle for change.

Eksteins, Rites of Spring, xvi.
Ibid., 73.
38
German idealism was based on the doctrine that the ultimate reality of the universe resided in the
metaphysical realm of ideas rather than in the information gain from sense perception. The halcyon days of
this philosophy occurred in the era from the mid-eighteenth century to the Revolutions of 1848. Immanuel
Kant, Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich Schiller were some of the most famous progenitors of the
German idealist tradition. For more on German idealism see Steven Ozment, A Mighty Fortress: A New
History of the German People (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 147-52. For an account of German
idealism as it was interpreted by German intellectuals around the tum of the twentieth century, see H.
Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930
(New York: Random House, 1958; New York: Vintage Books, 196 1) 183-248.
36

37
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Much like Fischer, Eksteins believed that the Germans approached World War I
with the desire to fulfill their nation's perceived destiny as the new leader in European
affairs. However, unlike Fischer, Eksteins claimed that they were not concerned with
preserving the existing social structures, but were driven by an urge to create a new
society out of the ashes of war. Interestingly, he pointed to a corresponding development
in the European artistic avant-garde. In the years leading up to the war, artists
demonstrated a preoccupation with death and rebirth. Through their creations they
announced that liberation and rejuvenation could be achieved through destruction. In a
similar way, many Germans carried with them a belief in redemption through blood
sacrifice as they plunged headlong into war.
According to Eksteins, the war spread this belief throughout Europe. The horrors
of trench warfare created a nightmare world of mechanical killing which severed all
connections to reality. The value systems of the past could not be used to make sense of
the total devastation. Under such circumstances, all that remained were visions for the
future. By war's end, the belief in creation through destruction was severely
transformed: the desire to create was now secondary to the desire to tear down; efforts to
challenge existing conventions intensified; and predictions of the future became
increasingly irrational and utopian. 39 Ultimately, the rebellious, madcap behavior of the
1920's did much to undermine old forms of authority, but offered little to take its place.
Eksteins believed that, in Germany, Nazism filled this void.
In one of his most provocative arguments, Eksteins claimed that Nazism tapped
into the currents of the age in a manner that was unparalleled in the rest of Europe. In
39

Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 328.
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every way, it was the extreme embodiment of forward motion and the Zeitgeist (spirit of
the age). The Nazis were so focused on the future that their vision became a fantasy,
utterly void of substance. Hitler and his ilk tried to reach their utopia by filling the void
with pageantry, myth making, symbolism, and aesthetics; but as Eksteins said, they
"confused the relationship between life and art, myth and reality."40 The result was a
nihilistic drive toward self-affirmation, from which creation was impossible and
genocidal destruction was inevitable. 4 1
Eksteins' work marked a radical break with the existing historiography. Although
he still searched for continuities between Imperial and Nazi Germany, he turned on its
head the conclusions of an entire generation. By portraying Germany as the foremost
representative of modernism, he inverted interpretations that emphasized German
backwardness or conservatism, and thereby took the conclusions of Blackbourn and Eley
to another level.
Since the mid 1990's, scholars have produced studies on German intellectuals that
seem to bolster Eksteins' views. Some of Wolfgang Mommsen's later works fall into
this category. In many ways, Mommsen was a member of Fritz Ringer's generation. For
most of his highly distinguished career he produced studies that accepted the idea that
Imperial Germany was politically backward and socially underdeveloped. However, in
the last decade of his life he published several studies on artists and writers in late
Imperial Germany that support some of Eksteins' conclusions. 42
40
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In particular, Mommsen confirmed that German intellectuals believed in the
redemptive powers of war. In the years before the war there was a general feeling of
boredom, stagnation, and sterility with regards to high culture. Many members of the
avant-garde felt that bourgeois, materialist society had stifled the ability to create and that
war would provide new stimulation for their artistic faculties. By the summer of 1914,
"the assumption that war would be an ideal, and perhaps unavoidable, means of
revitalizing a national culture that had grown stagnant was wide-spread, even among
more liberal thinkers."43 Thus, with an eye toward the future, German cultural elites
welcomed the outbreak of hostilities "almost to a man."44
According to Mommsen, the German academic community supported the war
with even more enthusiasm than artists and writers. He claimed that this was primarily
due to its close relationship to the state and aristocracy. Demonstrating his intellectual
kinship with Ringer's position, Mommsen agreed that academics were predominantly
driven by the desire to preserve their position of privilege within society. Since that
position, and the entire system of government, had its ideological base in German
idealism, their wartime writings attempted to legitimize the decision to go to war by
portraying the conflict as a defensive struggle to protect German culture. Mommsen
admited that, like the avant-garde, German academics believed that a new age was
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dawning; however, their redemptive message was saturated with appeals to retain the
basic political and social structures of Imperial Germany. 45
In general, Mommsen's description of GelJll.an intellectuals at the outbreak of war
indicated an oveiwhelming sense of unity among them. While mandarins were joined
together by their own particular concepts of professional identity, they shared with artists
and writers a common view of the war as a redemptive force. Predictably, then, the unity
among intellectuals dissolved when opinions on the war changed. By 1916, many artists
and writers had discarded their earlier positive views of war, and a small but growing
number of academics joined them. For these intellectuals, the war had lost all semblance
of rationality or higher meaning, so they began to question its legitimacy. Politics played
a key role in this process, with those on the left tending to adopt a more moderate or even
anti-war stance. Like Ringer, Mommsen stressed that most left-leaning intellectuals
increasingly objected to the nationalistic rhetoric and annexationist war aims of those on
the right. When Germany was defeated, the more classically liberal, internationalist
philosophy of the left provided the basis for the new experiment in democratic
government. Mommsen concluded, however, that the rifts created during the war would
come back to haunt the Weimar government, as the nationalist sentiments cultivated by
those intellectuals on the right helped to undermine the republic and lay the foundations
for the rise of Nazism. 46
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Mommsen' s views seemed to straddle two trends in the historiography: his work
on artists and writers appears to support Eksteins' conclusions; while his statements about
academics mirror assumptions from the 1960's and 70's. Over the last decade, several
young scholars have published studies on German academics which clearly reflect the
influence of newer trends in the historiography.47 Perhaps the best example of this
scholarship is Stefan Bruendel's Volksgemeinschaft oder Volksstaat.48 Bruendel's
purpose was to examine the notion that the "ideas of 19 14" were a source of conflict
within the German academic community. His primary contention was that the "ideas of
19 14" found their origin in an almost universal desire among academics to reform
Imperial Germany through the creation of an "inklusive Volksgemeinschaft." Thus, far
from endorsing the status quo, German intellectuals sought to create a new society.49
During the first two years of the war, Bruendel claimed, there was a great deal of
unity among academics with regards to the "ideas of 19 14." All agreed that Germany
was fighting to defend its unique way of life from Western aggression. They believed
that a strong state, based on German idealism, would make the nation more able to
navigate its way through the modem age and offer it protection from future cultural
invasions by the West. Admittedly, conflicts arose as mandarins adopted interpretations
of the "ideas of 19 14" that could be construed as either politically left or right;
47
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nevertheless, there was a great deal of ambiguity in the mandarins' positions, making it
difficult to draw clear distinctions between "modernist" or "orthodox" until well into the
war.50
Bruendel placed emphasis on the year 1916 as a turning point in mandarin
relations. The disastrous battle of Verdun and the seeming futility of the war effort
caused most of the mandarins to vent their frustrations by intensifying their nationalistic
rhetoric. This alienated a minority whose idea of an "informal rule" (informale
Herrschaft) over Central Europe was generally incompatible with the majority's growing

desire for direct control through annexation. For Bruendel, this was the moment when
the concept of "inklusive Volksgemeinschaft" dissolved into calls for either an "exklusive
Volksgemeinschaft" or an "inklusive Volksstaat." Thereafter, the majority advocated the

creation of an exklusive Volksgemeinschaft, based on the idea of German cultural
homogeneity. The minority, on the other hand, favored the inklusive Volksstaat, which
was to incorporate both German culture and some of the universally inclusive principles
of democracy.5 1 During the final eighteen months of the war, these two positions became
increasingly radical and polarized. Yet, despite this fissure, commonalities remained
across the divide. Even the formation of the Vaterlandspartei by the right (August 1917),
and the Volksbundfii.r Freiheit und Vaterland by the left (December 1917) were not
enough to eliminate mutual feelings of German political and cultural exceptionalism.52
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Bruendel concluded that it was not until the German Revolution of 1918 and subsequent
creation of Weimar that the di visions became permanent.
In some respects, Bruendel's study was a synthesis of different viewpoints. Like
Ringer and Mommsen, he demonstrated the existence of a strong sense of identity among
academics. Additionally, he agreed that the academic community was almost entirely
united at the outbreak of war. However, he challenged both senior scholars by
emphasizing the difficulty of drawing distinctions between academics simply by
following political lines. 5 3 Indeed, his remarks regarding the ambiguities over
annexations resembled those made by Fischer. And yet Bruendel's conclusions
obviously tended toward the direction charted by Eksteins; he clearly demonstrated that
German academics were interested in reform, creation, and forward progress, not
conservation, preservation, and the status quo. So, paradoxically, while the academics
may have believed in defending Germany's unique tradition of idealism, they hoped to do
so by constructing a new, more modem society.
This brief examination of the historiography of German intellectuals during the
First World War has revealed the points of agreement and points of contention among
modem historians. The idea that German intellectuals were a united, cohesive group at
the outbreak of war is something on which almost all scholars can agree; however, there
is still no genuine concurrence as to why this unity existed and what its content was.
Most believe that a common tradition of German idealism was an important unifying
53
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factor, as was an ambition to increase the nation's power and prestige. Yet historians
continue to debate whether this drive reflected a backward-looking desire to preserve or a
forward-looking urge to create. Furthermore, it has yet to be determined precisely why
the intellectuals' unity eroded. Political differences seem to be a starting point.
However, as Bruendel has pointed out in the case of annexations, these differences are
not apparent and clear distinctions between left and right are not easily made. Thus, it
remains to be proven what motivated the intellectuals to unite and what drove them apart.
Establishing clarity in these matters is of great importance to the general
historiography of modem Germany. Historians have unanimously agreed that the
divisiveness experienced by the German intellectual community during World War I had
an adverse effect on the Weimar system and ultimately contributed to the rise of Nazism.
The current study will help to create a better understanding of these historical processes
by lifting the fog of uncertainty from the subject of wartime unity among German
intellectuals. Comparing the war propaganda of Werner Sombart, Friedrich Meinecke,
and Thomas Mann will reveal that German intellectuals were never as united as they
appeared. By tracing the evolution of these intellectuals' prewar political views this
study will demonstrate that, although they shared a similar concept of German identity
and a similar desire to revive national culture, the differing political inclinations that each
man carried with him into the war colored his visions for Germany's postwar future and
threatened to undermine any attempt at lasting consensus.
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Chapter One: A Nation of Heroes

Werner Sombart's political views underwent a dramatic transformation in the
twenty years prior to World War I. During his student days in the early 1880's he was a
self-proclaimed "blood red Social Democrat."54 In the late 1890's he began to distance
himself from the party politics of the SPD but remained an advocate of socialist reform. 55
At the tum of the century he painfully questioned his adherence to the Marxist ideal.
And by the outbreak of World War I, he had completely rejected his previous position on
the political left in favor of a racist, nationalistic position on the right. Such a left-to-right
political development was not entirely uncommon among the German intellectuals of
Sombart's era. Nevertheless, Sombart's particularly dramatic struggle to form
ideological allegiances was almost unmatched by his contemporaries, and this internal
torment left an indelible imprint on his scholarly work.
The exceptionality of both the man and his work has prompted some scholars to
claim that he can be classified as neither "orthodox" nor "moderate" but, instead,
occupies a place all his own. 56 However, given Sombart's relative estrangement from
other German intellectuals, it is ironic that many historians remember him as the
mouthpiece for that group's views on World War I. 57 Indeed, it is almost impossible to
find an account of German intellectuals during the war that does not cite Sombart's
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Handler und Heiden. The vivacious clarity with which this piece explained the perceived

cultural struggle between Germany and the West has led many historians to view it as the
quintessential expression Kulturkrieg propaganda. There is a great deal of truth in this
claim as Handler und Heiden certainly displays a concept of cultural identity, based on
German idealism, that was widely shared by other German intellectuals. Additionally,
like the majority of German intellectuals' wartime writings, the text portrays World War I
as a redemptive force with the power to create a new German society. However, its
description of this future society differs from other accounts in crucial ways and is a
reflection of Sombart's distinct political and ideological evolution. Exploring the manner
in which Handler und Heiden represents both Sombart's political views and the more
widely-held cultural views of German intellectual community will help to shed light on
the nature of unity among German intellectuals during World War I.
As the son of a bourgeois politician, Werner Sombart's ideological development
began at an early age. 58 His father's involvement in the National Liberal Party influenced
his views as a youth, and it was not until his days as a university student in the 1880's
that he began to develop his own Weltanschauung.59 While studying economics at the
Universities of Berlin and Pisa, Sombart became fascinated with Marxism. His interest
stemmed from his belief that, through the process of class struggle, the proletariat would
restore the communal bonds that had been destroyed by modem capitalist society. In his
view, industrialism had brought forth important technological advancements, but it had
also created an increase in individualism and materialism. Sombart believed that Marx
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had failed to adequately address these issues in his work. Thus, for the next twenty years,
he attempted to "complete" the Marxist perspective by identifying the spiritual
components of capitalist development; in doing so, he hoped to introduce a new aspect of
German idealism to Marx's materialist views. 60
Sombart remained a loyal and outspoken advocate of socialism during the
1880's. 6 1 But over the next decade, as his high-minded attempts at reforming Marxism
clashed with the realities of interest politics and SPD dogma, his devotion to the cause
steadily slipped away. He began to question the proletariat's ability to transcend
materialism and establish a genuine spirit of community. He expressed this sentiment in
one of his most important scholarly works, Der Modeme Kapitalismus in 1902, and again
four years later in Das Proletariat (1906). By this time Sombart viewed the proletarian
as a typical "city dweller": "abstract, rational, and utilitarian," completely "removed from
nature and fantasy," and characterized by the "predominance of understanding over
feeling. "62
The apparent spiritual bankruptcy of the working class drove Sombart to conclude
that the only remedy to individualism and materialism lay outside the bounds of modem
society. Thus he began attacking all the progenitors of industrialism, including his own
nation. In Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert ( 1903), he
lambasted Imperial Germany for its emphasis on industrialization and even proposed a
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link between the German national character and the spirit of capitalism. This conclusion
plunged Sombart into a feeling of deep despair and marked a point of total estrangement
from his nation and from society at large. 63
Sombart's solution to this isolation is evident in his publications from 1908 to
1913. In Karl Marx und die Sozialwissenschaft (1908), Der Kapitalistische Untemehmer
(1909), Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (1912), and Der Bourgeois (1913), he further
distanced himself from socialism and modem society but reconnected with the German
nation. He did so by cultivating a dualistic view of capitalist development which divided
the "spirit" of capitalism into two parts. Sombart claimed that on one side was a spirit of
enterprise, adventure, vivacity, and creation; all of which were embodied by the
"entrepreneur." The other side was a force of rationality, calculation, greed, and
materialism; qualities that were personified by the "merchant" or "trader." The
entrepreneurial spirit gave birth to "early capitalism" and had since remained stable.
Conversely, the merchant spirit had been subject to constant change and fluctuation. The
"high capitalism" of modem society had resulted when the merchant spirit spun out of
control, dominating the entrepreneurial spirit and giving rise to the materialism of
industrial life. 64
Sombart increasingly believed that racial characteristics played an important role
in this development. 65 Continuing his theme of dualism, he divided Europe's population
into "entrepreneurial" and "merchant" races. Of the latter, he believed the Jews to be the
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most important example. Citing their age-old practice of money lending, Sombart argued
that Jews had always been particularly materialistic and preoccupied with earthly
endeavors. 66 In contrast, Germans, with their concern for the transcendental, were the
ultimate expression of the entrepreneur spirit. Yet, in the industrial age, even Germany
had fallen under the influence of the merchant races. Nevertheless, if they consciously
rejected the profit-motivated mentality of the merchant races in favor of their own
entrepreneurial characteristics, the German people could return their nation to the
community oriented age of early capitalism.
With this conclusion, Sombart simultaneously cut his ties to socialism and took
what he felt to be a crucial step toward solving the problem of the isolated individual in
modem society. He no longer searched for community in a unified, international
working class. In his eyes, both the proletarian and bourgeoisie were a part of the
industrial, materialist world that he had come to reject. From this point forward, Sombart
turned his attention to analyzing his own nation, hoping to promote the creation of a
German Volk community.
During World War I, Sombart took the opportunity to enthusiastically employ his
newly revised theories in the service of his country. Handler und Heiden was the result.
Published in the spring of 1915, the text aimed to reveal the �ssential character of World
War I. In doing so, he hoped to demonstrate to the German people the larger significance
of their contribution to the struggle. Following the theme of his earlier writings, Sombart
66
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claimed that Europe had become dominated by two fundamentally disparate worldviews:
that of the "merchant" and that of the "hero." Again, he linked these distinct mindsets to
the spiritual origins of a race or nation. But while the Germans remained the primary
representatives of the entrepreneurial, hero spirit, Sombart made the timely substitution
of the English in place of the Jews as the progenitors of the merchant worldview. 67 He
explained that, due to their fundamental spiritual differences, these peoples were destined
to clash; consequently, World War I was the result of an inevitable struggle between the
two spirits for dominance over Europe. With Handler und Heiden, Sombart hoped to
enter this foray by revealing to the world the "incomparable superiority of the German
spirit. "68
The text began by considering the English merchant spirit. Sombart was quick to
point out that the term "merchant spirit" was an oxymoron because the defining
characteristic of that spirit was its complete attachment to the material world. This was
evident in its primary objective: to attain the greatest amount of earthly enjoyment for as
many individuals as possible. For this reason, those having the merchant perspective
approached life with the question, "What can Life give me?" Such a mindset produced a
view of human existence in which interpersonal relations were no more than commercial
transactions in which every individual attempts to gain the greatest profit for himself. 69
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Since the merchant spirit was born from commercialization, England, with its
long tradition of trade, had always been particularly susceptible to its influence. 70
Sombart claimed that the depth to which the merchant spirit penetrated English culture
was evident in that nation's philosophical tradition. Since Thomas More's Utopia
(1516), all ethical and political thought in England had been based on the principles of
utility: the greatest number of benefits for the greatest number of people. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "social contract" theories relegated the state to the
role of peace keeper because, according to the principles of the merchant worldview, the
greatest material gain occurs when conflicts are minimized. This standard was applied to
English foreign policy as well in the "balance of power" theory (in essence, war should
only be waged to defend trade relations or when there was profit to be made). When
combined with the way England "mechanically" accumulated its empire "piece by
piece," these developments demonstrated the schematic, "inorganic" way in which the
English state was formed. 7 1 According to Sombart, the English state and empire lacked
real inner unity but took the form of a giant trade organization, with different branches all
over the world. For him, the entire system resembled "a huge octopus, which consists
only of tentacles and an enormous digestion apparatus, and where all other organs . . . have
died off."7 2
Since it was anchored in the material world, nothing transcendental could arise
from a culture engrossed in the merchant worldview. In England, "comfort" and "sport"
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emerged as surrogates for actual spiritual values. In Sombart's view, these principles not
only replaced transcendental ideals, but also helped to expunge the last vestiges of
spiritual life from the English people. 73 Comfort as a means of making life easier was
harmless. It became dangerous, however, when people viewed it as an end in itself.
When a culture placed value on obtaining physical luxuries, it could not lift itself above
the contemplation of material concerns; unable to reach a higher level of existence, "a
Volk that [had] this worldview, such as the English, [was] no better than a pile of living

corpses."74 Sport, the "twin brother" of comfort, operated on the same principles.
Although sport contained potential benefits for the body, it had a degenerative effect on
the soul when it replaced or took precedence over important spiritual activities. 75
Against this picture of the materialist, merchant worldview Sombart introduced
the German spirit. Unlike the transparent English spirit, the spirit of the German people
defied simple definition. Calling on Nietzsche (and not for the last time), Sombart
invoked the great philosopher's description of the German spirit as ever changing,
multifarious, never "is" but always "becoming." Taking this into account, Sombart said
it was still possible to pinpoint certain essential features of the German character, which
distinguished it from all others. First and foremost, the German spirit was "the
unanimous rejection of everything that was English or Western European in thought and
sensation"; most specifically, it was the refutation "at all times of utilitarianism,
eudemonism, and therefore all philosophies of usefulness, happiness, and enjoyment."76
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Again, Sombart divided the world into material and spiritual realms: in the former, life
was individualized; in the latter, it was united. The goal of the German essence was to
leave the lower realm of individuals and become united in the higher realm of spirit. This
could only be accomplished through action, production, self sacrifice, and letting go of
material comforts. While the English approached the world asking "what can Life give
me," the German asked the question, "what can I give Life"; the merchant spoke of
rights, the German of duties. For Sombart this was the essence of heroism; thus he
crowed, "to be German is to be a hero."77
This heroic spirit could not be separated from the concept of "Fatherland." The
Fatherland, or Volk, was the earthly manifestation of spiritual unity for which each
German hero strives. Far from simply being a state, the Fatherland existed with or
without national boundaries; indeed, a German hero's love for the Fatherland was
completely apolitical. Sombart maintained that the relatively recent creation of the
German political state was an organic outgrowth of the collective will of the German
people, the next stage in a process of development toward spiritual unity. But while
actions of the individual received meaning only through his willing subordination to the
unified Fatherland, it was the unique function of the German state to give each individual
a voice, thereby preventing him from being "swallowed up" by the whole.
According to Sombart, the English were completely unable to understand the
German concept of Fatherland. The merchant spirit prevented them from comprehending
a state that did not operate in accordance with the principles of utility. Consequently,
they saw the undemocratic German state as a burden from which its masses must be
77 Sombart, Handler, 63-5.
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freed. Taking the same position on the subject of German militarism, the English could
not conceive of the possible benefits of a militaristic society. For Sombart the advantage
was clear; militarism was yet another emanation of the hero spirit. Through militarism
the heroic ideals of courage, sacrifice, bravery, obedience, piety, and reverence were
actualized. This gave the German people a markedly different opinion of war. Unlike
the English merchants, who shied away from combat without material profit, the
Germans embraced war, seeing it as "the holiest thing on earth."78 While the English
shamefully employed foreign soldiers and colonial auxiliaries to fight in their wars,
Germany gladly sacrificed the best the Volk could offer. That a man went to his death for
the preservation of the Fatherland was the highest consecration of the hero spirit; and the
outbreak of World War I gave young Germans the opportunity for this expression.
By the tum of the twentieth century, Sombart claimed, the merchant worldview
was poised to take over Europe. English commercialism had spread its tendrils over
much of the continent, bringing with it the twin non-values of comfort and sport.
Sombart shamefully admitted that the merchant worldview had even penetrated the
German Volk. Rapid industrialization in the years before the war had elevated material
concerns and suffocated the hero spirit. The culturally anemic German people, lacking
any sense of a higher purpose, soon became "lost in living well, coupling, filling the
belly, emptying the intestines, and running senselessly back and forth."79 Various groups
made vain attempts to alleviate the effects of the "English poison." Some people viewed
socialism as the best form of a cure. However, as Sombart was eager to point out, the
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ethos of socialism made it ill-equipped to combat the merchant' spirit. Born of the liberal
"ideas of 1789," socialism's core values of freedom, equality, and individual liberty were
all merchant values. Furthermore, socialism replaced duty to the Fatherland with duty to
a vague "Humanity." Most repulsive of all was the fact that modem socialism had lost
all semblance of its old self and had degenerated into an economic interest movement for
the proletariat; rather than initiating a world-historical revolution, its goal had become to
gain as many material advantages as possible for the working class. This all added up to
the conclusion that socialism was "nothing more than capitalism or commercialism with a
different name." 80
Just when it seemed as though humanity would succumb to the merchant
worldview, "like a miracle," war arrived. In Sombart's eyes, World War I resulted from
the German heroic spirit attempting to break through the surrounding malaise of the
modem, materialist world. Like an unused muscle, the heroic spirit atrophied in the
culturally insipid prewar environment; yet, by confronting and defeating the
representatives of the merchant worldview, the heroic spirit would be reinvigorated.
Thus, the war was a cleansing process; a way for the heroic spirit to be reborn. Seeing
the war as a redemptive force reestablished the German people's sense of purpose; the
anomie of modem life was dissolved by renewed service to both Volk and state. In what
was, for Sombart, a true thing of beauty, the war seemed to unite Germans from every
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level of society in an effort to destroy the influence of the merchant worldview for all
time. 8 1
To be certain, one could not expect the merchant worldview to go quietly into the
night, as its toxins were still present in the German bloodstream during the first months of
the war. With disgust, Sombart relayed a German soldier's report from the front in which
the man spoke with great fascination about the English soldiers' shaving kits. ''This is
sad," Sombart declared, "in the midst of such great events, to think only of the removal of
stubble from one's face. It seems to me an ugly sign of the hollow English huckster's
culture." 82 Still, Sombart remained convinced that the war would cleanse Germany of the
merchant ideals. In some of his most dramatic testimony, he concluded Handler und
Heiden with his vision of post-war Europe.

Once Germany had vanquished the agents of the merchant worldview, Sombart
believed the nation would be reborn as the highest expression of the heroic spirit. The
state would exist as both the living will of the German people and as a suit of armor,
shielding the Volk from threats by rival states. Freed from the influence of pure
commercialism, economic endeavors would be subordinate to the service and protection
of the Volk. 83 Culturally, Germany would be entirely self-sufficient, sheltered from
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"West-European ideas." 84 Nevertheless, for Sombart, a certain amount of
cosmopolitanism was part of the German nature; thus, the Volk would appreciate the
cultural creations of other lands, with the obvious exception of England. Of course, other
nations would despise Germany after its victory in the war. As it had been with the
Greeks and Jews in ancient times, as God's chosen people, the German Volk would be
hated for its superiority. 85
Still, for all its power, Germany would treat other countries with benevolence.
Sombart believed that the German goal was not to conquer foreign lands and culturally
convert them as the English had done. He scoffed, "Fear not, dear neighbors: we will not
6

devour you. What would we do with that indigestible bit of food in our stomach?"8

However, he continued, "if it is necessary that we enlarge our property so that the greater
body of the Volk gets space to develop, then we will take as much land as needed." 87 It
was a testament to the supremacy of the heroic spirit that it could not be exported, but
could only be organically grown; and, according to Sombart, that was exactly what
Germany would occupy itself with following the war. Closed off from the rest of the
world, the German Volk would perpetuate the heroic spirit for all etemity. 88
Given the tone and message of Handler und Heiden, it is tempting to dismiss it as
the ostentatious ramblings of a crazed German nationalist. However, within these
bombastic ruminations are keys to understanding nature of unity among German
84
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intellectuals during World War I. Specifically, Sombart's text displays the same concept
of German identity that can be found in countless wartime publications by German
intellectuals. Influenced by German idealism, it portrays the German people as spiritual,
community-oriented, self-sacrificing; always engaged in a process of self-analysis and
constantly changing, developing, and moving forward. In contrast, it identifies Western
Europeans (in this case Britons above all) as materialistic, self-serving, individualistic,
and unable to rise above terrestrial concerns. 89 Like other German intellectuals at the
time, Sombart viewed pre-war Germany as polluted by the forces of democracy,
industrialization, and self-interest, all of which were emanating from Western Europe.
He agreed with his compatriots that World War I was a struggle to the death between
German and Western cultures; and that a German defeat meant the end of their way of
life. However, they all also believed that victory meant the birth of a new German
society, one that was free from the problems that had plagued the Imperial state.
Yet, despite these similarities, Handler und Heiden differs from the writings of
other German intellectuals by reflecting aspects of Sombart's own unique
Weltanschauung. The entire structure of the argument followed in the footsteps of his
earlier work on the genesis of capitalism. Sombart retained his dualistic view of
opposing capitalist spirits and continued to trace their origins to racial characteristics.
Although he changed the details of the argument in order to coincide with the concrete
facts of the war, his conclusion remained the same: the merchant spirit and all its
89
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manifestations must be cleansed from Germany in order to establish a genuine national
community. 90
These assumptions clearly resulted from his political and ideological movement
away from Marxism. In the years before the war, he had ceased to believe in the
proletariat's ability to form a cohesive community, and no longer felt that a solution to
the problem of the isolated individual lay within the bounds of modem, industrial society.
He had become increasingly convinced that communal bonds could be established only
within the racial and cultural homogeneity of the German Volk. Handler und Heiden
reflects this view in its picture of a post-war Germany that was internally united and
culturally isolated from the rest of Europe. Sombart continued to promote the complete
expulsion of democracy, commercialism, individualism, materialism, and all other
negative aspects of modem capitalism from German society. Territorial expansion would
only be attempted when it aided in the development of German culture; otherwise,
Germany would remain in a shell, cultivating its unique culture of community in .
accordance with German idealism. 9 1
While Sombart's particular ideas of German exceptionalism have been widely
recognized as "protofascist," modem scholars have disagreed about the true nature of his
political inclinations. Although some historians have described him as a Marxist turned
Nazi, others believe that Sombart never truly subscribed to either ideology. Instead, these
scholars claim, he merely attempted to resolve his search for community by applying his
90
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personal theories first to Marxism and then to Nazism, both without success. 92 But even
without pinpointing Sombart's political position, it is clear that his specific vision of post
war Germany clashed with those of other German intellectuals on both the left and right.
For members of the right who favored vast annexations, Sombart's cautious position on
territorial expansion was unacceptable. Intellectuals on the left felt similarly dissatisfied
with his view of an anti-democratic Germany. The idea that the nation should be entirely
sealed off from the world must have also seemed unreasonable to many German
intellectuals, regardless of their political affiliations.
Thus it has become apparent that Handler und Heiden demonstrates areas of both
convergence and telling divergence with respect to the wartime publications of other
German intellectuals. All the texts share similar views of German identity and the nature
of World War I; which would seem to indicate the existence of a consensus among
German intellectuals on these cultural matters. However, beyond this, Sombart's vision
of a racially pure postwar Germany demonstrates that an individual's unique political
inclinations could bring his work into conflict with other members of the German
intellectual community. An analogous situation appears with regards to the wartime
propaganda of Friedrich Meinecke; but unlike the mercurial Sombart, Meinecke's
political inclinations remained grounded in a search for balance.
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Chapter Two: A Cosmopolitan Nation-State
In his professional and political life, Friedrich Meinecke was a moderate in every
sense of the word. As a historian, he devoted his energy to pointing out the contrasting
poles between which the Western world had moved: rule and freedom, nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, power and ethics. 93 Politically, his search for balance led him to
advocate both individual freedom and a powerful state apparatus. During World War I,
Meinecke's political worldview greatly influenced the propaganda he produced. As with
other German intellectuals, his writings criticized the Allied nations while praising
Germany's unique culture and spirit. Additionally, like his colleagues, Meinecke saw the
war as a creative force, capable of propelling Germany forward. However, his warnings
against radical nationalism fell on deaf ears, and the democratic German nation-state he
envisioned for the future was, in fact, something many of his peers sought to avoid.
Thus, as with the case of Werner Sombart, exploring Meinecke's political views and their
impact on his propagandistic wartime writings will help to uncover the forces that united
German intellectuals during World War I and those that drove them apart.
Friedrich Meinecke was born in Salzwedel in 1862. 94 As a child, his moderate
nature was overshadowed by the patriotism of his parents. Like other children of middle
class Prussian families, Meinecke was taught at an early age to respect the instruments of
the state and look upon the figure of Otto von Bismarck with awe and reverence. Even at
the tender age of seven, Meinecke demonstrated his love for the state by composing
"blood-and-thunder" war poems about the Prussian victory over Austria in the Seven
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Weeks' War. 95 In 1 87 1 , Meinecke's family moved to Berlin. Growing up in the
burgeoning capital of Bismarck's newly-united Germany only strengthened his support
for the existence of a powerful, conservative state.
Meinecke's experiences as a student at the University of Berlin in the mid 1 880s
reinforced his Prussian upbringing in some ways, but also presented new challenges to
his youthful worldview. Under the tutelage of scholars like Heinrich von Treitschke,
Heinrich Sybel, and Johann Gustav Droysen, Meinecke received a heavy dose of Leopold
von Ranke' s "Prussian School of Historiography."96 One of the primary tenets of this
thinking was that an objective view of history could be obtained through the study of
state formation and development.97 For Ranke, the state was the vehicle with which a
nation could protect and assert itself. In his view, history was the account of power
struggles between states as different nations attempted to impose their wills on one
another. Not coincidentally, most Ranke disciples wrote histories on the German nation's
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attempts to achieve statehood. However, many of these devotees misrepresented Ranke's
ideas by overemphasizing the importance of force, deception, and guile in the process of
state formation. Politically, these "Neo-Rankeans" used their research to justify and extol
the policies of Realpolitik and to elevate their version of Bismarck's legacy to mythical
proportions. 98
Meinecke absorbed much from the "Prussian School of Historiography." In
particular, he was deeply influenced by Ranke's historical method and view on the
relationship between state and nation. These ideas added fuel to Meinecke's childhood
fascination with the German state and directed his professional career toward the study of
political history. Meinecke broke away from the "Neo-Rankeans," however, by refusing
to bow to the idol of power. He continued to respect Bismarck's achievements, and
understood that state power ensured national growth; nevertheless, he maintained that
there must be limitations on a state's ability to enforce its will upon its own population.
Without such boundaries, the drive for naked power would overshadow the creative
capacities of both the individual and the nation. Thus, after receiving his degree in 1886,
Meinecke devoted his career to searching for a balance between the powerful state and
personal freedom.
Over the next decade, Meinecke's political ideas were in a state of flux. While
working at the Prussian state archive, he made several discoveries that resolved his qu�.st
for balance and also precipitated a shift in his political inclinations from conservative to
moderate. In 1890, after encountering an essay by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Meinecke
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became fascinated by Germany's period of classical liberalism and humanism. 99 He soon
began writing a massive two volume biography of Hermann von Boyen (Leben des
Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen, 1896-9), which brought him into intimate
contact with ideas of the German Enlightenment. 1 00 The great minds of the movement,
Humboldt, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, and others, all stressed the importance of the
individual and his capacity for growth and creativity. These German thinkers were
principally concerned with spiritual development and, unlike their French counterparts,
did not automatically equate self-realization with self-government. Instead, they
emphasized "a sovereign private life and a self-sacrificing public life." 1 0 1 In these ideas,
Meinecke believed he had found the key to combining individual freedom and the
authoritarian power-state. His Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat (1907) provides a
thorough explanation of this proposed solution, and is the ultimate expression of
Meinecke's political and ideological worldview in the years before World War I.
The central theme of Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat (Cosmopolitanism and
Nation-State) was the emergence of the German nation-state from the cosmopolitan
doctrines of rationalism and romanticism. 1 02 According to Meinecke, the process began
with the universal ideals of the German Enlightenment thinkers which, in promoting the
inalienable rights of man, had laid the moral foundations of the state. He believed that
99
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these thinkers were correct to declare that the individual's freedom of expression was the
basis of humanity, and that protecting that freedom was of paramount importance. Yet,
in their zeal to create a European community based on universal ideals, these thinkers
failed to acknowledge the realities of power-politics. In particular, they wrongly assumed
that states would ignore their own self-interests and protect the freedom of other states.
This error in judgment became evident at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where German
attempts to create a nation-state under European-wide protection were foiled by self
seeking "Balance of Power" policies. 1

03

For Meinecke, it took both the ideas of Leopold von Ranke and the actions of
Otto von Bismarck to overcome the deficiencies of the early-nineteenth century thinkers.
For his part, Ranke combated idealism by reintroducing Machiavellian realism into
political theory. In particular, he argued that states were naturally self-serving entities
that acted solely in their own best interests. Consequently, international solidarity
between states became an idealistic fantasy because, in reality, states were engaged in an
unremitting struggle for power. Such theories helped to remove the ideological barriers
from the path of German state development. 1
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Bismarck continued the process by

skillfully eliminating the physical barriers to unification. But while Meinecke admired
Bismarck's success in implementing Realpolitik, he felt that the chancellor's actions had
lacked a moral underpinning. Unlike Bismarck, Meinecke did not believe that the simple
necessity of realist policies sufficiently justified the pursuit of power; on the contrary,
such a short-sighted mentality led to the acquisition of power for its own sake. Although
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this approach had been required to bring the German state into existence, ethical
standards were needed to guide the state's drive for power and keep it in check. 105
To locate these standards, Meinecke returned to the values of early-nineteenth
century Germany. Like the German Enlightenment thinkers, he viewed the nation as the
best vehicle for organizing free and harmonious human relationships. Therefore, he also
saw the nation as the medium through which human beings could achieve the highest
degree of self-expression, both as individuals and collectively in the form of culture
(Kultur). Ethical guidelines for state policy thus could be found by joining the power

drive of the state to the creative properties of the nation. In other words, if the state was
the political manifestation of a national will, then its egoistic drive for power was natural
and acceptable, so long as it acted in accordance with the nation's drive to protect,
perpetuate, or increase its capacity for creativity and expression. 106 The greatest
weakness of the German Enlightenment thinkers had been their failure to recognize this
connection and their subsequent view of the powerful state as a detriment, not a benefit,
to individual freedom. Meinecke concluded Weltburgertum und Nationalstaat by
claiming that, since the power-state (Machtstaat) was the guardian of the culture-state
(Kulturstaat), all necessary steps must be taken to ensure the existence of a strong state,

capable of protecting the nation and its culture. 1 07
Guided by these conclusions, Meinecke's political actions in the years preceding
World War I were primarily focused on strengthening the state. As he looked out on the
political landscape of pre-war Germany, he saw disenfranchised masses, resentful of the
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existing governmental system. Since a divided population severely weakened the state,
Meinecke believed that it was necessary to transform working class indignation into
national allegiance, through political enfranchisement. Thus, he joined other "modernist"
mandarins in supporting the National Liberal party and, later, Friedrich Naumann's short
lived National Social Union. 108 Nonetheless, Meinecke was by no means an ardent
democrat. Like other mandarins, he questioned whether unsupervised political
involvement by the masses might not accelerate the decay of high-culture that had
plagued the modem age. Even so, Meinecke saw democracy as the unavoidable
byproduct of industrialization. Thus, the only way for Germany to compete with other
technologically advanced states was to reform its political system in accordance with the
demands of industrialized society . 109
Pointing out the pragmatism in Meinecke's views on democracy is not to gainsay
his commitment to the idea of a Volkstaat. It was still his desire that Germany would
someday walk the tightrope between power and the individual, becoming the first state to
embody the collective will of an entire nation. Given this drean:i, it is easy to see why he
joined other German intellectuals in interpreting the unity of the "August experience" as
the dawning of a new age. Like so many of his colleagues, Meinecke published
propagandistic pamphlets during the initial months of World War I in order to justify the
German war effort and offer his vision for a post-war future. The first of these, Die
deutsche Erhebung von 1914 (The German Uprising of 1914), displayed many

similarities to the wartime propaganda of other German intellectuals; however, as with
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Sombart's Handler und Heiden, Die deutsche Erhebung ultimately reflected Meinecke's
own distinctive political views, which harbored the possibility for conflict with his peers.
Following in the footsteps of Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat, Die Deutsche
Erhebung focused on the evolution of the German state. Meinecke' s central argument
was that World War I should be seen as the culminating event in a series of German
revolutions, which sought to create a uniquely German nation-state. As in his earlier
work, Meinecke began by discussing the ideological foundations of the nation-state. He
claimed that, around the tum of the nineteenth century, the German Enlightenment
thinkers realized that an individual could commune with the spiritual through the medium
of the nation, and that the state was the highest expression of national will. Ever since,
Germany had tried to create a state which allowed its citizens to exist as creative, free
individuals, while still remaining subordinate to the will of the nation.
The Wars of Liberation in 1813, the Revolutions of 1848, and the Franco-Prussian
war of 1870, were all milestones in the process of German state formation; yet, each had
failed to create an appropriate medium for the expression of the German spirit.
According to Meinecke, the German Wars of Liberation had successfully expelled
Napoleon, in part, because of the feelings of national unity which they inspired.
Nevertheless, the political immaturity of the masses and the ideological nai'vete of
reformist leaders prevented them from capitalizing on the feelings of German solidarity.
In the end, a strong conservative backlash from the Prussian government quashed the
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formation of a nation-state. Despite the failures of the early-nineteenth century, Meinecke
claimed, the desire for a nation-state still burned in the hearts of many Germans. 1 10
This desire was to burst forth again in the Revolutions of 1848, but, to Meinecke,
the leaders of this uprising were even more incompetent than their predecessors of 1813.
Steeped in an "infinity of delusions" these liberal revolutionaries still suffered from an
overabundance of noble hopes and a dearth of practical statesmanship. Among their most
serious blunders was the inability to see the "sturdy Prussian state-organism" and its
robust military as a valuable unifying force. 1 1 1 These facts were not lost on Otto von
Bismarck.
As he had already in Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat, Bismarck again appeared
as the great liberator of the German nation. Through his understanding of power-politics,
Bismarck put an end to the quixotic fantasies that had retarded state development.
Armed with the doctrines of Realpolitik, this modem-day Moses led the German people
from the wilderness of idealism to the promised land of the nation-state. 1 1 2 For
Meinecke, the serendipitous character of the "Uprising of 1870" was that the will of the
entire nation had been embodied in the figure of one man; without Bismarck's personal
desire for power, the unification of Germany would not have been possible. Yet this was
also the revolution's biggest shortcoming. Having so little direct responsibility for
unification left the German people politically weak and underdeveloped. Thus, while
their state was united, the nation could not proficiently utilize its political mechanism to
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heal internal class conflicts. Instead, it succumbed to the centrifugal forces of
modemity. 1 1 3
Initially, following unification, Germany's creative energy burst forth in a period
of massive industrial development. Meinecke claimed that, while this increased the
power of the state, it divided the German nation into different classes. Class-based
economic interest groups came to dominate the government and soon "the crude traits of
materialism and egoism began to disfigure the intellectual and political life of the
nation." 1 1 4 By the 1890's this materialism had affected Germany's creative capacities.
According to Meinecke, cultural putrification had occurred all over Europe in the
decades before World War I. Lust for commerce and material wealth had eclipsed
creative desires and "a mass of mediocre talents" dominated the intellectual landscape.
The resulting "aesthetic insensibility" limited artistic creations to "cheap ornaments of
mass production and popular taste." 1 1 5 Meinecke found it most disturbing, however, that
some of the intellectual movements that developed during this time, such as positivism in
France, treated the state as a "monster, the deadly adversary of the individual." 1 1 6 For
him, the central problem of the modem age was the contrary: the individual had become
isolated from the nation-state. Alone and thus unable to fully express themselves, people
were floundering in an abyss of individuality. 1 1 7
Meinecke believed that the Germans had experienced this problem every bit as
much as other Europeans; yet they alone possessed the means to overcome it, through
1 13

Meinecke, Erhebung, 18-9.
Ibid., 19.
1 15
Ibid., 19-20.
1 16
Ibid., 22.
1 17
Ibid., 22, 32-3.
1 14

48

their unique national characteristics. He claimed that the German spirit contained the
antithetical attributes of forward motion and contemplation; the impulse to forge ahead
was always tempered by the desire to reflect on the current situation and past
developments. 1 1 8 In Meinecke's eyes, this innate power of self-analysis would allow
Germany to avoid the "decadent self-surrender" that had afflicted its neighbors and move
forward as they sat idle. A desire to create the perfect form of state had been swelling
within the German heart for a hundred years. In the modern age, when the individual was
more isolated than ever, the German idea of unity in service of the state seemed like the
perfect solution. A catalyst was all that the German people needed in order to realize
their goal.
Meinecke believed that World War I provided that breakthrough moment. It
immediately united all Germans in the spirit of service to the Fatherland. Suddenly the
individual was imbued with a fresh sense of purpose, and the despondency of modern life
melted away. The German spirit of self-sacrifice manifested itself on the battlefield. For
Meinecke, the deaths of those heroic soldiers released creative, redemptive powers. The
war was a "sacred Springtime" for Germany, "the sap of the tree that brings forth flowers
and greenery." 1 1 9 With the aid of these powers, the German spirit would end its series of
revolutions and at last create a perfect nation-state. 1 20
Meinecke claimed that, in contrast to Germany's mission of spiritual rejuvenation,
the Allies had entirely materialistic motivations for war in 1914. France wanted to regain
the territory it lost in the Franco-Prussian war, and secretly sought revenge for the
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humiliation it suffered in that conflict; Russia wanted to expand its hegemony over Slavic
lands; and England wanted to do away with its new economic rival. 121 Each had
operated according to the laws of power-politics, believing that war had been in the best
interest of the state; still, none could boast of Germany's "greater passions of a just war, a
holy war." 122 Despite admiring its deep cultural traditions, Meinecke was disturbed by
what he saw as Western Europe's morally shallow attempts to isolate Germany through
slander. Although the nations were at war, he saw no reason for the "wanton destruction
of old and vital cultural bonds" between Western and Germanic worlds. 123 Meinecke was
frustrated by the Janus-faced Allied nations who, while calling Germany a militaristic
dictatorship, themselves conquered foreign lands and denied the rights of their colonial
subjects. In his view, the German spirit of self-analysis minimized this kind of
hypocritical doublespeak. Thus, he claimed, "The Western Europeans had the formal and
aesthetic advantages of an older social culture . . . But in the hour which decides the fate of
the world, the language of truth has a higher cultural value." 1 24
Meinecke published Die deutsche Erhebung during the first six months of the
war, when the hopes for a quick, decisive German victory were at their height. Thus, his
vision for the postwar period reflected this enthusiasm. In Meinecke's eyes, Germany
would emerge from the conflict as the first true nation-state. The unity, heroism, and
patriotism inspired by the war would endure through the subsequent period of peace.
Certainly there would still be friction among various interest groups; nonetheless, the
memory of common suffering during war would motivate the German people to
121
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overcome their differences of opinion. 125 Most importantly, Germany would achieve its
century-long goal of combining individual freedom and creativity with national unity,
under the protection of a powerful state.
Meinecke claimed that, as the new leading world power, Germany would not
pursue unscrupulous policies of conquest, as the English had done; nevertheless, it would
expand its overseas colonies if such activity was necessary to maintain its industrial
vitality. 1 26 Ultimately, however, the German people would remain content once their
cultural creations and political boundaries were secured from outside threats. This is not
to say that Meinecke believed Germany should separate itself from the rest of Europe.
On the contrary, he felt that to isolate Germany, especially in the cultural sense, was to
deny its distinct tradition of cosmopolitanism. 1 27 The German people had always
attempted to absorb the world's cultural wealth, and they had much to teach others as
well. In particular, Meinecke indicated that the rest of Europe might someday follow
Germany's model of the perfected nation-state. Therefore, his vision of the future was a
Europe in which Germany was able to securely coexist with its neighbors while
simultaneously fulfilling its great spiritual destiny as a "world-nation." 128
But in order for this vision to become a reality, Germany first had to win the war.
It seemed to Meinecke that the conflict had become "a struggle of Westem European
culture against German culture." 129 He proclaimed to his countrymen that, under such
dire circumstances, "the fate of our national culture, our prosperity as well as our spiritual
1 25
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life, our freedom as well as our unity, hangs in the balance . . . " 130 In their slanderous
propaganda campaign, the Allied nations had done their best to isolate Germany from the
rest of the world, both politically and culturally. Always the moderate, Meinecke
admonished his people not to respond in kind. Allowing national unity to degenerate into
jingoism would only spoil the noble purpose of the German revolution. As long as it
maintained a balance between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, Meinecke was
convinced that Germany would combine moral superiority with its military superiority to
produce a "new dawn" for the nation-state.
As with Sombart's Handler und Heiden, it would be tempting for the casual
reader to dismiss Meinecke's Die deutsche Erhebung as empty wartime propaganda. But
a comparison of the two works reveals the latter's importance in resolving the question of
unity among German intellectuals during the war. For instance, both texts reveal points
of consensus between the authors with regard to German identity. Following the German
Idealist tradition, Meinecke and Sombart each described the German spirit as constantly
growing and changing, and always driven toward a higher level of existence.
Furthermore, both authors agreed that the nation was the proper medium through which
an individual could commune with the transcendental. Thus, they joined in praising the
uniquely German concepts of heroism, self-sacrifice, service to the state, and loyalty to
the Fatherland. Both Meinecke and Sombart viewed the years before the war as a
stagnant period which endangered these values. In their eyes, materialism had
overshadowed culture and industrialization had isolated the individual. But they also
believed in the vitality of the German people, and interpreted World War I as the German
1 30
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spirit's attempt to break through the malaise of the modem age. In this way, the authors
considered the war to be a "holy" force of creation and redemption. Nevertheless, they
agreed that the possibility of destruction lingered; and defeat at the hands of the Allies
meant certain death for the German way of life.
Beyond these important general similarities, Die deutsche Erhebung and Handler
und Heiden reflect larger conflicts based on their authors' differing political worldviews.

As an ideological descendent of the German Enlightenment, Meinecke used Die deutsche
Erhebung to argue for the existence of universal laws, individual rights, and cultural

creation for the good of humanity. Unlike Sombart's unmitigated condemnation of the
"merchant spirit," he did not attack the philosophical foundation of Western Europe
because he had an ideological stake in its legitimacy. When Meinecke did criticize
France and Britain, he most often related their deficiencies to the negative circumstances
of war, power-politics, or the modem age. By presenting the problems of materialism as a
Europe-wide phenomenon, instead of a Western poison, he salvaged the value of Western
culture and politics.
The two authors' visions of post-war Germany reveal further disagreements.
Meinecke's cosmopolitan nation-state would have driven Sombart to despair. To him,
the intermingling of peoples and cultures would only result in pollution of the German
"hero spirit." For Meinecke, Sombart's racially pure, politically isolated state was both
undesirable and impractical. Not only would it lead to the kind of nationalistic fanaticism
that degraded German culture, it ignored the Rankean insight that the nature of power
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politics demanded Germany's involvement in international affairs. 1 3 1 Interestingly, both
authors agreed on the question of annexations, believing that Germany should pursue
only limited territorial expansion. Ironically, though, their reasons were diametrically
opposed: Sombart maintained this position to protect Germany from contamination by
foreign peoples, while Meinecke hoped to avoid conflicts that would interrupt cultural
exchange.
The areas of conflict and consensus between Die deutsche Erhebung and Handler
und Heiden demonstrate their importance in revealing the true nature of unity among the
German intellectuals during World War I. In comparing Meinecke's propagandistic
writing to that of Sombart, the outlines of a pattern have begun to emerge. It is becoming
clear that, regardless of German intellectuals' shared cultural identity, differing political
inclinations threatened their community with discord. Even those who claimed to lack
political views contributed to this conflict, as the case of the "nonpolitical" Thomas Mann
will demonstrate.
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Chapter Three: A "Nonpolitical" Nation
As one of Germany's most famous authors, Thomas Mann spent his literary
career exposing the ironies of the human condition. That he did so is not surprising
considering that his own personal life was filled with paradox, contradiction, and internal
tension. All of these elements combine to produce Mann' s multifaceted, intensely
complex personal philosophy. During the First World War, one specific aspect of this
worldview came to the forefront: his notion of politics and the isolated artist. In essence,
Mann maintained that an artist' s separation from political concerns enhanced his creative
abilities. This belief was reflected in his wartime propaganda, which applauded
Germany' s "nonpolitical" culture and attacked Western democracies. Yet, the irony of
Mann 's position is clear; in praising the nonpolitical, he unintentionally ended his own
artistic isolation from the material realm of politics.
The contradictory nature of his argument notwithstanding, Mann had good reason
to believe he was nonpolitical. In Imperial Germany, the state honored artistic freedom
and allowed the artist to live in relative peace, so long as his creations posed no threat to
political stability. 1 3 2 This ambivalence between state and artist stood in sharp contrast to
the bond between the state and German academics. Unlike artists, German academics
had a vested interest in the state because it was the source of their livelihood. Thus,
exploring Mann's wartime propaganda will add the artists' nonpolitical perspective to the
study of unity among German intellectuals during World War 1. 1 33 Like Sombart and

1 32

Hannelore Mundt, Understanding Thomas Mann (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South
Carolina Press, 2004), 99.
133
For more on the general perspective of artists during World War I, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen,
"German artists, writers and intellectuals and the meaning of war, 1914-1918" in State, Society, and

55
Meinecke, Mann's writing expressed a notion of German identity that many other
intellectuals shared. Furthermore, it reflected the widespread belief that the war held the
possibility for cultural rejuvenation or cultural destruction. However, as with Sombart
and Meinecke, Mann's political (or "nonpolitical") views on the isolation of the artist
carried the potential for conflict with other German intellectuals.
Mann's personal experiences with artistic isolation began at an early age. He was
born in the medieval Hansa port city of Lilbeck in 1875. 134 His father was a well-to-do
grain merchant who had risen to prominence within the city government. Descended
from a long line of North German bourgeois, Mann's father hoped his son would follow
in his footsteps, taking over the family business and leading a respectable middle-class
life. But while Mann was to inherit his father's bourgeois sense of discipline and self
control, his inner being resembled that of his mother. A mixture of Portuguese-Creole,
Brazilian, and German lineage, she was an exotically beautiful and musical woman who
instilled in her son a passion for art. Throughout his youth, Mann wrestled with the
tension between his parental influences; but despite attempts to play the role that his
father had prescribed for him, Mann's artistic elan prevented him from being comfortable
within the confines of traditional bourgeois society.
Isolation followed Mann from early childhood into adulthood. In school, he
performed poorly. He expressed little interest in the curriculum, and was finally able to
complete his education only after repeating grades several times. 135 Clownish antics
brought him friends, yet feelings of intellectual superiority and nascent homosexuality
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often left him melancholy and detached from his peers. 136 His father's death, in 1891,
brought about the liquidation of the family business and ended Mann's future
occupational obligations. But while he had become free to pursue his literary and artistic
desires, he continued to doubt the legitimacy of such an undertaking. In a letter written in
1895, Mann called the artist a "good-for-nothing" whose libertine, outsider's existence he
wanted to avoid; he claimed that "one needs a firm hold, an orderly occupation in order
not to fall into idle ways. " 1 37 He attempted to find such an occupation as a clerk at an
insurance company, but remained at the position only until his first short story was
published. Within five years of surrendering to a literary career, Mann had published his
enormously successful novel Buddenbrooks ( 1901). However, international renown did
not end his feelings of isolation and, in fact, further distanced him from a bourgeois
society that was suspicious of artists and their "irregular way of living." 1 3 8
In an effort to come to terms with this situation, Mann authored several works
justifying the isolation of the artist. Of these writings, his novella Tonio Kroger (1903)
was the most significant. The story follows its title character through a twenty-five year
struggle to accept his dual identity as both an artist and a member of the bourgeoisie. In
his youth, Tonio is painfully tom between joining the material, commercial world of his
father and following his own artistic impulses. After a male classmate ignores his
attempts at affection, he bids farewell to the community of the common man and
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submerges himself in the isolation of art. 1 39 Years pass and Tonio's detachment from
society increases. With the growing separation, his ability to love life and humankind
fades, and he descends into an existence of carnality and nihilism. Ultimately, however,
his bourgeois propensity for order and restraint resurfaces and prevents him from
continuing on the path of self-destruction. In the end Tonio, now in his forties, finally
accepts his dualistic nature. He realizes that, as an artist, he must remain separated from
society in order to gain insights into human existence. Nevertheless, he also recognizes
that, as a bourgeois, his "love for the human, the living, and the ordinary" constantly
inspires him to share his knowledge with others. 1 40 The reader is left with the irony that,
while art's goal is to convey truth to humanity, the artist can only create, and thus
communicate, when he is isolated.
The implications of Tonio Kroger are clear. Although Mann saw no end to the
isolation of the artist, he made the separation more bearable by demonstrating its
necessity and desirability. For him, freedom from everyday social and material concerns
became a kind of "critical distance," allowing the artist to perceive truths to which the
average person was blind. 141 Caught between a world of reasoned regulation and creative
impulse, it seemed that the bourgeois artist was doomed to struggle with internal strife as
well as isolation. Nonetheless, Mann showed that bourgeois tendencies actually
1 39
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benefited the artist by preventing him from overindulging in art or losing sight of its true
communicative purposes. With these justifications, Mann, like Tonio Kroger, was able to
accept his dualistic position, despite its unresolved ironic tensions.
In the remaining years before World War I, Mann continued to explore the
position of the isolated artist. Having already established the primacy of artistic freedom,
he now focused on the negative consequences of disrespecting the boundaries between an
artist and society. 1 42 Ironically, though, when war broke out Mann wasted no time in
joining the propaganda campaign against Western Europe. By September of 1914, his
brief essay "Gedanken im Krieg" (''Thoughts in War") appeared among the masses of
other anti-Western writings by German intellectuals. He followed this work with the
more subtle "Friedrich und die GroBe Koalition" ("Frederick and the Grand Coalition")
in early 1915. Unsatisfied with the brevity of his first two efforts, Mann quickly began
work on Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Although he had several motivations for
writing this piece, his primary intention was to demonstrate the ways in which Germany's
unique nonpolitical culture protected artistic freedom and fostered creativity. 1 43 But
Mann understood that, in writing political tropes, he descended to a material world that
violated his principles of isolation. Therefore, in many ways, Betrachtungen became yet
another attempt at resolving his own internal tension; and what had been intended as a
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concise study of German culture and World War I slowly ballooned into a six-hundred
page exercise in self-analysis.
One of Mann's primary goals in Betrachtungen was to describe the fundamental
nature of Germany's "nonpolitical" culture. He claimed that this task was made difficult
because the German essence was ethereal, amorphous, and always in a state of shifting,
changing, and becoming. As with all things spiritual, the German character could not be
comprehended through the direct means of rationality; instead, it could only be
understood through an indirect medium such as art. Obviously, if there were no way to
directly speak of the German essence, Mann's textual reflections would have been over
before they began. Nevertheless, he worked around this problem by employing the
notion that any concept can be understood by examining its opposite. 1 44 Therefore, in
order to understand Germany's "nonpolitical" nature, Mann examined everything
associated with "politics." But before he did this, he first established an even more
important dichotomy; that of Zivilisation and Kultur. 1 45
In Mann's view, the difference between Zivilisation and Kultur was more than the
age-old formula of "material versus spiritual." 1 46 Although it was primarily concerned
with the physical world, Zivilisation, like Kultur, had its own transcendent qualities.
Those qualities (reason, enlightenment, individual freedom) were born of Western
144
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Europe and reached their maturity in the French Revolution. The ultimate goal of
Zivilisation was to understand the universe through the lens of rationality so that it might

better serve humanity. Applied to the realm of human relations, Zivilisation manifested
itself in the form of politics. For Mann, utility, equality, and the social contract were key
characteristics of politics because they were completely rational ways of viewing
interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, Mann stated that "belief in politics is belief in
democracy," because democracy was the logical, and thus, most revered outcome of a
worldview that valued each individual equally. 147
Mann claimed that Kultur was the antithesis of Zivilisation. Its primary goal was
not to scrutinize the material aspects of life, but to gain knowledge of the universe
through the power of intuition, and to transmit these insights through artistic mediums.
Human reason played almost no role in these processes, making the byproducts of
rationality (politics, democracy, and egalitarianism) of no importance to Kultur.
Individual freedom was significant in that it allowed for creative diversity, but total
equality had a leveling effect, which stifled more talented personalities. Thus, Kultur's
notion of justice was reflected in the slogan "to each his own," not "to all the same." 148
Mann went on to say that, since all creative impulses emerged from mankind's union
with the spiritual, to apply rationality to the spiritual (as Zivilisation did) was to
demystify and destroy it. In this way, Zivilisation had an inherently stultifying,
degenerative effect on Kultur. 1 49
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From Mann's perspective, this destructive relationship was acutely evident
throughout Europe in the years preceding World War I. For over a century, Zivilisation's
internationalist message of democracy had helped it to spread across much of the
continent. Class conflicts were fueled by the demands for social and political equality.
Concern for utility, happiness, and the physical world brought with it an increased
interest in creature comforts and a "senseless worship of affluence." 150 In short, the
nineteenth century had become a "commercial epoch" in which the philosophy of
materialism reigned supreme and high-art was left to decay. 15 1
As the vanguard of Kultur, Germany was particularly affected by these negative
developments. In Mann's view, the German people naturally adopted the values of
Kultur rather than Zivilisation because, for much of their history, they had been bound

together by the cultural ties of the nation, not the political ties of the state. Lacking
sociopolitical concerns, Germans had created a rich artistic tradition which, for Mann,
revolved around its middle class. In a chapter entitled "Bii.rgerlichkeit" ("burgherly
nature") he explained how members of the German middle class were free from both
political affairs and monetary constraints, and thus were able to engage in personal
cultivation (Bildung) and artistic creativity. 152 Fortunately, Mann claimed, the burghers'
sense of duty and organization helped them to promote ethical aspects of art and
prevented them from sinking into decadent aestheticism. 153 The insights gleaned from
150
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this balanced approach formed the basis of German culture, to which the German people
looked for moral guidance and a sense of identity. 1 54 Even after state formation in 1871,
the burgherly artists were able to continue this cultural interchange because political
matters rested in the hands of the Imperial bureaucracy. However, when Zivilisation
entered the equation, as it had in the pre-war years, the result was potentially devastating.
Simply put, democracy jeopardized the burgher artists' ability to create by eliminating
their critical distance from political and material concerns. Without the creative flow
from these cultural wellsprings, Germany was in danger of losing the source of its spirit
and identity. 155
Like any living organism, the German spirit had a drive for self-preservation; and
thus it lashed out at the threat posed by Zivilisation. Mann believed that, from its habitual
position as a cultural outsider, Germany had developed a history of "protesting" against
encroachment by the West. The barbarian hordes, Luther, the Romantics; all were part of
this tradition. Nevertheless, Germany had also been the ideological battleground of
Europe. Geographically positioned between a rational Western Europe and a passionate
Eastern Europe, Germany, like its burgher artists, occupied the space between two
worlds. 1 56 Thus, for Mann, the "intellectual antitheses" of the entire continent were
miniaturized within "the soul, the mind, and the heart of the individual German." 1 57
Consequently, he saw the German revolt against Zivilisation both as a rebellion against
1 54
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the West and also as the result of a European-wide attempt to overcome the crisis of
materialism.
According to Mann, the breakthrough came in the form of World War I. He
claimed that the majority of Germans (himself included) viewed the war both as a chance
to liberate the world from materialism and as an opportunity to realize their national
destiny. 1 58 They all believed that, after crushing the Western enemies of Kultur,
Germany would be reborn as the new world power. Yet, it would not be simply an
economic or military power, as France and Britain had been; instead, it would become the
first Weltvolk des Geistes (world-nation of the spirit). 1 59 The German people "had taken
a long drink at the fountain of ambition" and believed that they alone possessed the
positive values of modernity (progress, youth, genius, novelty) to move forward into a
new age of Kultur. 1 60 Thus, Mann explained, "the indescribable uprising in the summer
of 1 9 14 was an uprising of belief, of unbounded readiness . . . " 1 6 1 Its shockwaves "spread
everywhere ... awakening in every breast the most somber, the oldest, the simplest, and the
strongest feelings." 1 62
Nevertheless, there were those Germans who did not unite with their countrymen
and, instead, took the side of Western Europe. Mann called these people
Zivilisationsliteraten, or "literary men of civilization." Far from being anti-German,

these individuals were very patriotic and wanted to help Germany solve the social
problems caused by industrialization. However, they thought the solution rested in the
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democratization and politicization of Germany, not realizing that the result would be the
death of its uniquely nonpolitical spirit. It was this group (of which his own brother
Heinrich was a member) that inspired Mann to define the nature of the German culture
and to call for its preservation. 1 63
Mann understood that he was fighting a losing battle. By the time he completed
Betrachtungen in 1918, the German war effort was failing and calls for democracy were

rising among the masses. His final vision for Germany's future reflected this desperate
situation. No longer did he entertain the possibility of victory. Instead he only hoped
that Germany would somehow remain "unbeaten"; because if it could avoid total
submission to the forces of the West, it might be able to salvage some facet of its unique
culture. 1 64 Mann considered the creation of a Volksstaat as one possible avenue for
preserving the German spirit; however, he was unsure whether such an institution could
seriously represent the German national will (as it was intended to do). 165 In all
probability it would devolve into a soulless Western democracy, in which case the "de
Germanization" of Germany was inevitable. Regardless of what the future held, Mann
concluded his cogitations by restating his loyalty to the creative German spirit, even in
the face of its destruction. And yet, he could not help but feel that, in analyzing
Germany's nonpolitical culture, he had unintentionally contributed to its rationalization,
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politicization, and degradation. 1 66 Thus, as he had done so many times before, Mann
ended his work with the strong scent of irony and unresolved tension hanging in the air.
As with Handler und Heiden and Die deutsche Erhebung, Betrachtungen eines
Unpolitischen provides clues to understanding the extent to which unity existed among
German intellectuals during World War I. For instance, Mann's description of German
identity and the nature of World War I was almost indistinguishable from that of Sombart
and Meinecke. Like them, Mann obtained his notion of the German spirit largely from
the Idealist tradition; and as a result, he too described the German essence as ethereal,
protean, and constantly shifting, developing, and evolving as it attempted to unite with
the spiritual. All three authors believed that excessive exposure to the crass physical
world was inimical to the German spirit, and that, in the years preceding World War I,
Germany had witnessed a dangerous increase in materialism. For them, the war was a
chance to confront this threat in one spectacular breakthrough moment. Nonetheless,
they all agreed that the stakes in the conflict were incredibly high: victory would bring
the revitalization of German culture and the dawning of a new age, but defeat would
bring an end to the German way of life.
Despite these areas of consensus, Mann's message of political nonparticipation in
Betrachtungen caused it to differ greatly from Handler und Heiden and Die deutsche
Erhebung. Most importantly, unlike Sombart and Meinecke, Mann did not believe that
the state played an active role in the creation of German culture. He would have
disagreed with Sombart's idea that a racially pure state was the highest expression of the
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German spirit. 1 67 For Mann, such a radically nationalistic state would have denied
Germany's position as the ideological middleman of Europe. Like Meinecke, he believed
that Germany could benefit from contact with certain cultural contributions of the
West. 168 However, Mann's total rejection of Western democracy stood in clear contrast
to Meinecke's "modernist" position. 1 69 Although both supported the creation of a
Volksstaat to guard German culture, Mann did so with great reservation and only as a last
resort. 1 70 In this way, his apprehension of state power resembled the view of the German
Enlightenment thinkers that Meinecke had strongly criticized. 1 7 1
Beyond Meinecke and Sombart, it is clear that many other German academics
would have found Mann's nonpolitical position unacceptable. Unlike artists, who
inhabited the periphery of society, German academics had obtained an elevated social
standing by serving as advisors to the state. Consequently, they did not share Mann's
ambivalence toward a seemingly remote Imperial government, nor could they echo his
claim of "having no life or death interest" in its operations. 1 72 But, as ironic as it may be,
the artist's nonpolitical position still had political implications, which could easily
become the source of conflict.
1 67

However, an interesting similarity between the two existed in their notions of the burgher artist and
the heroic entrepreneur. Mann himself mused on the fact that both he and Sombart had independently
theorized that the German middle class was the creative force behind its national culture. Nonetheless, he
called Sombart's synthesis of hero, merchant, and burgher "greatly exaggerated." Mann, Betrachtungen,
127.
1 68 Mann especially admired the English contributions to the development of the novel. Ibid., 439.
1 69 See Ringer's discussion of the German mandarins' "modernist" and "orthodox" political positions,
Introduction page 8.
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It should be noted that Mann gained his basic concept of Volksstaat from the general ideas that
Meinecke and others members of the center and left had propagated during the war.
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See Chapter 2.
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Mann reflected the feelings of most artists when he described the impersonal state as "a stem,
wooden figure with a full black beard, with a star on his breast, and adorned with a mixture of military
academic titles that appropriately signified its power and legality: as General Doktor von Staat." Mann,
Betrachtungen, 225-6.

Thus, it is evident that Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen provides another
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important element to understanding the nature of unity among German intellectuals
during World War I. By comparing the nonpolitical perspective of Mann's war
propaganda to the writings of Sombart and Meinecke a pattern becomes clear.
Regardless of a shared cultural identity, differing political views threatened to undermine
any sense of real unity among German intellectuals. Exploring the implications of this
discovery for the historiography of German intellectuals is all that remains.
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Conclusion

Comparing the propagandistic wartime writings of Werner Sombart, Friedrich
Meinecke, and Thomas Mann demonstrates that, during World War I, the German
intellectual community was never as united as it appeared. The areas of cultural
consensus that bound German intellectuals together in the first months of the war were
destined to be overshadowed by political conflicts. Thus, like a microcosm of Imperial
Germany, the intellectual community's sparkling exterior of strength and unanimity
failed to conceal the fragmentation and disjointedness that existed just below the surface.
Nevertheless, the unity among German intellectuals during World War I was not
entirely fictive. This study of three exemplary figures has demonstrated that Sombart,
Meinecke, and Mann all exhibited the same conception of national identity, based largely
on the German Idealist tradition. In their eyes, to be German was to be artistic, cultural,
nationally oriented, constantly developing, and always focused on the spiritual realm. All
of the authors agreed that the metaphysical nature of this identity made it vulnerable to
the materialism of modem, industrial society. Likewise, they all maintained that the First
World War was essentially a clash between German culture and Western materialism,
thereby juxtaposing their own perceived identity with the values of Western Europe.
Finally, they all believed that the war held great powers of rejuvenation and that, if
Germany was able to survive such a trial by fire, it would rise from the ashes renewed,
revived, and reborn.
Yet, despite their similar views on these cultural issues, a more extensive
unanimity among Sombart, Meinecke, and Mann was prevented by their differing
political inclinations. This fact becomes particularly evident when comparing the
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authors' predictions for postwar Germany. While Sombart believed that Germany's
future rested in a racially pure, authoritarian state, Meinecke envisioned a cosmopolitan,
democratic nation-state. For his part, Mann only hoped for a state system that
encouraged political nonparticipation. Thus, regardless of their shared desire for a
revitalized Germany, the political views fueling their visions for the future were entirely
incompatible with one another. Any attempt to attempt to bring these dreams to life
would eventually lead to conflict.
The significance of these findings is manifold. By demonstrating the similarities
between Sombart, Meinecke, and Mann's perceptions of national identity and the nature
of World War I, this study shows that common rallying points existed among German
intellectuals. Thus, it supports the belief among modem historians that the German
intellectual community was largely united in the initial months of World War I.
Furthermore, it also gives insights into the cultural ties that bound the intellectuals
together. For example, Sombart, Meinecke, and Mann's description of a Germany poised
to fulfill its national destiny revives Fritz Fischer's claim that Germans were united by
their desire to become a world power. However, this study counters Fischer's picture by
emphasizing the importance of political inclinations as a source of conflict within the
German intellectual community. In this way, it echoes Fritz Ringer, Wolfgang
Mommsen, Stefan Bruendel, and others who claim that, during the war, political
differences drove a wedge into the German intellectual community and destroyed any
feelings of harmony that might have existed. Moreover, it supports the notion among
these same authors that this political factionalism carried over into the Weimar
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government, crystallizing the division between the intellectuals on the left and right and
weakening the ideological foundations of the fledgling republic.
There is still some uncertainty as to exactly when this split between intellectuals
first occurred and what the primary catalyst might have been. Many historians believe
that the 1916 relaxation of censorship on the discussion of war aims was a key moment
because it allowed for controversy over specific future programs to erupt. 1 73 While this
study does nothing to oppose such claims, it does demonstrate that comparing
annexationist aims is not an entirely reliable method for gauging conflict among German
intellectuals. As Sombart and Meinecke proved, individuals could express similar
opinions on territorial expansion for entirely opposite political reasons. Additionally,
although open disagreement among German intellectuals may not have manifested itself
until 1916, it is obvious that tensions existed prior to that year. In particular, the cases of
Sombart, Meinecke, and Mann demonstrate how a German intellectual' s wartime
propaganda was heavily influenced by his prewar political inclinations. Thus, it seems
that while the political disputes occasioned by World War I ultimately divided the
German intellectual community, the seeds of those conflicts had been planted long before
the outbreak of war.
Once again, this is not to say that the unity that German intellectuals expressed at
the beginning of the war was a total mirage. Clearly, the intellectuals in this study were
unified in their desire to preserve the integrity of certain social, political, and cultural
institutions. However, this was not a drive to maintain the status quo. As Mann said,
173

See Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 2 nd ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 158- 165; and Mommsen, "German artists, writers and intellectuals and
the meaning of war, 19 14- 19 18" in State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War,
ed. John Horne. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2 1 -38.
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"Being conservative does not mean wanting to preserve everything that exists ... Being
conservative means wanting to keep Germany German." 1 74 In the 1960's and 1970's,
historians often failed to acknowledge this subtle but crucial distinction. Consequently,
(whether intentionally or unintentionally) their accounts were inclined to portray German
intellectuals as backward-looking proponents of the Imperial system. 1 75 This study
separates itself from such conclusions by demonstrating that, within their wartime
propaganda, German intellectuals advocated the creation of a new, more perfect German
society. In this way, it resembles more recent accounts by Geoff Eley, David
Blackboum, Kevin Repp, Stefan Bruendel, and many others, all of whom have
underlined the progressive aspects of Imperial Germany. 176
However, the conclusions drawn from this study are perhaps most significant in
their affinities to Modris Eksteins' Rites of Spring. In particular, they bolster Eksteins'
argument that the German people were basically future-oriented and believed that they
possessed the attributes necessary to overcome the cultural stagnation of the modem,
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Mann, Betrachtungen, 189.
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industrial age. 1 77 This examination of Sombart, Meinecke, and Mann has shown that
these authors expressed such a sentiment time and again in their descriptions of the
dynamic, forward-moving German spirit and its drive to free itself from the stultification
of materialism. Furthermore, this study has illustrated how each man believed that the
war was a creative, breakthrough moment and that the destruction it wrought would
purify and revitalized Germany. Both of these points mirror Eksteins' observation that a
belief in the power of creation through destruction pervaded intellectual discourse during
the war. In Eksteins' account, these ideas became popularized in the years following
World War I and ultimately resulted in Nazi Germany's nihilistic drive toward total
devastation. While such claims lie beyond the immediate scope of this essay, it is still
possible to relate its findings to the rise of Nazism in Germany.
The most apparent connection between the German intellectuals of this study and
the proponents of Nazism was their shared desire to create a more perfect Germany. For
both groups, this involved uniting the German Volk by establishing an environment in
which their unique national attributes could flourish. Sombart's vision of a racially
homogenous German state demonstrates how closely an intellectual's concept of this
perfect environment could mirror that of the Nazis. Conversely, Meinecke's vision of a
cosmopolitan nation-state bore almost no resemblance to the Third Reich. Nonetheless,
Meinecke, Mann, and many other German intellectuals may have indirectly contributed
to the rise of Nazism through their propaganda campaign during World War I. By
1 77

Reinhart Koselleck has made interesting observations on the modem perception of movement and
progress and its impact on the creation of utopian visions. He has argued that the introduction of the notion
of progress to the human psyche has created a situation in which expectations for the future no longer need
be based on past experiences but are utopian fantasies with no foundation in empirical reality. Reinhard
Koselleck, On the Semantics ofHistorical Time (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1 985).
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zealously promoting German exceptionalism, they kindled the fires of a belief in racial
superiority that was to burst into flames during the Third Reich. Furthermore, by
propagating grandiose visions of national movements and spiritual revivals, they
cultivated an intellectual environment that encouraged flights into fantasy and from
which even more spectacular utopian visions could emerge. Finally, by advocating
political non-participation they ultimately supported turning a blind eye as the Nazis
gained increasing influence in the ailing Weimar system. 1 7 8
All of these aspects of the German intellectuals' propaganda campaign helped the
Nazis to succeed where the intellectuals themselves had failed: whereas their efforts to
sustain the unity of the "August experience" fell miserably short, the Nazis effectively
garnered public support for their spurious message of cultural rejuvenation. There are
numerous reasons why the intellectual community was unable to unite the German
population, but this study has pointed out that internal conflict over political issues played
a key role. As a community, German intellectuals sought to eliminate the social divisions
of prewar Germany by initiating a cultural revival. However, their differing political
inclinations led to the creation of competing visions for Germany's sociopolitical postwar
future. Thus, any cultural consensus that the intellectuals shared at the beginning of the
war was bound to unravel in the face of political conflicts. So, like Imperial Germany
itself, the intellectual community's outer unity simply masked the fragmentation that
existed below the surface. In the end, both would fall victim to these centrifugal forces.
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It should be noted that Mann was not among those individuals who ignored the political rise of
Nazism. Instead, he abandoned his non-political stance in the years following World War I and became a
fierce opponent of the Nazi regime.
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